7 The power of dialogue dynamics

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Introduction

This chapter is intended as a contribution to the theory of dialogue, especially as regards the origin and nature of various kinds of asymmetries in dialogues embedded in the contexts of social practices of different levels. In the most local context, different options are open to speakers when responding to prior utterances and when initiating new topics and new obligations, and asymmetries are identified on an utterance-to-utterance basis. Thus the power of dialogue dynamics, seen as the interplay of participants’ initiatives and responses, quite apart from the discourse itself, generates a web of social relations, commitments and responsibilities, and possibly also shared knowledge, attitudes and perspectives. Over and across the sequences of initiatives and responses there emerge patterns of symmetry versus asymmetry (dominance). Such emergent patterns can also be understood partly as reproductions of culturally established and institutionally congealed provisions and constraints on communicative activities.

Data from different sorts of social situations are referred to in this chapter, and some aspects of a theory of dialogue participation structure are conjectured. It is maintained that to focus on asymmetries in dialogue is theoretically and empirically well founded; such

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asymmetries epitomize some of the most fundamental properties of human interaction.

The social construction of dialogue

There seems to be an increasing consensus among scholars that we must understand social relations, cultural values and cognitive structures as socially produced and reproduced, as socially distributed and organized, as maintained, negotiated, adjusted and established in interaction between individuals who find themselves in social contexts and belonging to cultural traditions. Meanings and rationalities are socially (re-)produced and organized because they are products of interaction between people in social encounters and as such they are subject to social and physical boundary conditions. Meanings (frames and concepts, typifications, folk theories as well as professional knowledge) are socially shared sense-makings of the world. However, in a complex, diversified society people will have partially divergent experiences, and thus knowledge, values and attitudes will be differentially distributed, i.e. they are 'partially shared and only fragmentarily known' in a pluralistic world (Rommetveit, 1983). It is therefore necessary to have a look at the reproduction of intersubjectivity in a cultural and historical perspective (Vygotsky; Bakhtin; Marković, this volume, Introduction).

Meanings are not entirely constructed ad hoc in interaction; they belong to a cultural capital inherited and reinvested by new actors all the time. Communicative activities are interactionally constructed and managed, historically sedimented and institutionally congealed (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). In others words, microcontexts cannot be understood without some concept of macroframes (ethnographic and organizational contexts) (Cicourel, 1981). Yet, in this chapter I will approach the problems from the microcontext end of the scale, and we will only catch a few glimpses of the wider cultural ecologies involved.

This is not the place to argue for social constructivism (see e.g. Schutz, 1967, and later Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Heritage, 1984; Rommetveit, 1987). Nor is there space to explore the complexity of the dialectical relations, the interdependence, between key notions like meaning and context, thought and communication, expression and content, construction and tradition. I will simply assume that meaning is both context-dependent and an accomplishment and product of social (contextualized) practices, that thought is at the same time presupposed, processed and produced in inter- and intra-individual communication, that differences of form (expression)

usually entail differences in content and vice versa, and that there is a dialogical relation (Bakhtin, 1986) in communicative acts between what is created and produced and what is given, fixed, conventional and often taken for granted. On all these issues (and others that could be added), fundamental arguments for a Hegelian view (rather than the usual Cartesian view) have been advanced (Marković, 1982).

Dialogue, like social interaction in general, is dynamic in nature. The dynamics of dialogue may be said to reside in the fluctuating interdependencies between dialogue partners, and in the progression of actor-produced dyadic states, where actors are constantly dependent on perceptions and interpretations of each other’s actions. Communicative acts, e.g. conversational contributions, are always both context-dependent and context-renewing (where ‘context’ may be understood as the local dialogue context (co-text) but also as a more comprehensive situational frame). To use a terminology I will return to later on, interactants both ‘respond’ to (their perceptions of) the contextual conditions, expectations and obligations at hand, and also ‘initiate’ new contextual conditions by saying and doing things.

Another dynamic aspect of dialogue is the fact that dialogue is socially, or collectively, constructed and managed in a situational and cultural context. Conversation as an interactional achievement involves the co-construction of both expression and content (interpretation). ‘Speaking together’ involves the mutual consideration of each other’s presumed meanings, intentions and presuppositions leading to at least partially shared understandings.

The analysis of dialogue must therefore concern the relations between at least three complexes: utterance (or conversational contribution), understanding and context (Fillmore, 1985). It is not a dual relation between form (utterance) and content as many linguists and semioticians in the past would have it. The intrinsic relationships between our three poles can be expressed in several ways:

1. You understand an utterance by relating it to the context (both local contexts and global frames), i.e. by giving it meaning within a sufficiently coherent (though perhaps fragmentary) network of knowledge.
2. You display (part of) your understanding of contexts by uttering something specific at any given moment in the interaction.
3. You construct or renew the context by producing and/or understanding the utterance.

I am thus deeply opposed to the view of communication as a transportation of fixed meanings (the conduit metaphor of com-
munication in Reddy, 1979) and to the conception of dialogue as a fixed, static text with an intrinsic meaning (Vološinov, 1973; Rommetveit, 1974, 1983, 1986b; Linell, 1982). Dialogue is the locus for the dynamic construction and reconstruction of meaning. Through this process, dialogue expresses, reflects and determines social relations and culture-specific rationalities.

The dialogical interplay of initiatives and responses

Dialogue is a suitable locus for studies of power and dynamics on a scale from the most local contexts – sequences of adjacent dialogue contributions – up to situations and subcultures. I will follow this path in this chapter, starting with the most local contexts.

At the microlevel we can study the local dynamics of speaker-addressee relations on a turn-by-turn basis. Here we see the unfolding joint discourse as produced by context-determined and context-determining moves (conversational contributions). We will call these aspects of utterances responses and initiatives, respectively. In principle, every conversational contribution (utterance) exhibits both responsive and initiatory features. As Heritage (1987, p. 264) puts it, ‘Each social action is a recognizable commentary on, and intervention in, the setting of activity in which it occurs.’ Heritage (1984, 1987) firmly belongs in the ethnomethodological ‘Conversation Analysis’ (CA) tradition. One of the reasons that CA insists on the study of sequential organization in dialogue, rather than focusing on individual speech acts, is precisely because of the insight that an essential property of conversational contributions resides in their context-shaped and context-renewing (i.e. responsive and initiatory) nature. For mainly methodological reasons, CA studies these interrelations solely in terms of their manifestations in the flow of discourse itself.

The Russian tradition of semiotics (Bakhtin, Vološinov) is very different in this respect, in that it relates discourse to a much wider context involving culture and history too. Nevertheless, Bakhtin also regarded the Janus-like response-and-initiative nature of the utterance as the essence of the ‘dialogical principle’ (Todorov, 1984). A dialogue must be understood as a succession of interlocking utterances. Wertsch notes that Bakhtin’s concept of dialogicity is:

grounded in the observation that ‘any utterance is a link in the chain of speech communication’ [Bakhtin] 1986, p. 84. Associated with this the claim that every utterance responds in some way to previous utterances and anticipates the responses of other, succeeding ones. (Wertsch, 1987, p. 7)

Every utterance has a history in the discourse and an embeddedness in situation and culture, and it also projects possible continuations, more or less likely next-utterances. Marková (this volume, Chapter 6) expresses the same idea when she proposes that ‘words and speech actions have diagnoses and prognoses built into their meanings’ (p. 140). In my view, both ethnomethodology and Russian social psychology have made major contributions to the conceptual foundations of dialogue theory.

Leaving traditions aside for a moment, let us look at a few aspects of the power of dialogue dynamics. I will start with a rather trivial piece of conversation, taken from a casual exchange between two strangers who meet at a recreation centre out of town. Some utterances are exchanged about running at a nearby jogging track.

1. A: How long does it take to run the 10 kilometre track?
2. B: Up to an hour. That’s what it usually takes.
3. A: I see. [pause] Six minutes per kilometre.
4. B: Yes, but the kilometres are not really equally long on that track.
5. A: Oh, well, the ground varies like that?
6. B: Yes, that too, but then the distances aren’t equally long between the markings [i.e. kilometre markings].

In this extract, A starts by asking a question, which of course amounts to a conversational initiative; B is put under the obligation when continuing the dialogue to keep to the condition that he provide a relevant answer (or, at least, by giving some reason why he could not do so). In this case, he does give an answer, though hardly more than a minimal answer. In other words, B does not take any independent initiative of his own. This leaves A with an opportunity, even an implicit responsibility, to accept and give some credit to B for his response. A does this (‘I see’), but he also uses his turn to add a reflection, which, at the same time, may be said to display A’s understanding of B’s response. It is therefore (possibly) also an explanation for why he asked the question in 1 in the first place. Now B, in 4, reacts to A’s interpretation in 3, carrying on the dialogue by taking a new, though topically relevant, initiative. A, in 5, does not appear to be quite sure how to understand B’s remark, and according-
ly, his response to 4 involves a new initiative, requesting more information. B gives this, thus using his turn to explain what he meant (or may have meant) by his preceding remark (4). In this way, the dialogue is collectively brought forward by the interlocutors’ responding to each other and taking new initiatives in Heritage’s terms (see above), by commenting on the preceding contributions and making new interventions. At the same time, the actors are seen to display their unfolding understanding of the joint discourse on a moment-to-moment basis. Incidentally, we may note that understanding is not something which is necessarily ‘there’ before verbalization. Thus, to an observer it is not evident that B, when uttering 4, was already aware that what he meant by it was precisely what, just a few moments later, he explained as 6. (As a matter of fact, I happen to know that B was not fully aware of it, since I was B in this example!) Understanding develops in and through the dialogue itself. In Schegloff’s (1982, p. 75) words:

The discourse should be treated as an achievement; that involves treating the discourse as something ‘produced’ over time, incrementally accomplished, rather than born naturally whole out of the speaker’s forehead, the delivery of a cognitive plan.

As we can see, we can study the dynamic relations between utterance, meaning and context at work on a turn-to-turn basis. Each contribution or turn is dependent on the preceding turn(s), but it also partially determines the conditions for relevant next turns. Many utterances must be seen as multifunctional and ambiguous. There is an inherent ‘incompleteness’ in a linguistic expression in that it does not ‘carry with it’ its meaning. Rather, meaning is a locally produced accomplishment and interactants use their turns in talking to display their understanding of the preceding utterances in their context. In this way interpretation, whether exposed in actual utterances or merely intra-individual, largely builds up coherence in discourse (Hopper, 1983). This also implies that there is a continuous interplay between the production and understanding aspects of communicative activities. In fact, understanding is not simply displayed in discourse; it is (at least to some extent) created (achieved) through the verbalization act itself. In Rommetveit’s terms (1988a), ‘making sense of’ something and ‘bringing it into language’ are two aspects of the same complex process (also Rommetveit, this volume, Chapter 4).

There is an inherent power in dialogue to generate further dialogue: understanding of previous contributions is displayed in responses, expansions and new initiatives, and utterances project

new utterances to come. With Maturana and Varela (1987), who compare dialogue to a living organism, we might think of this ability as a ‘self-reproducing (self-organizing) principle’ in dialogue. (It seems evident, however, that a theory of autopoietic systems, regarding them as independent of external forces (Maturana and Varela, 1980) is not sufficient to account for the mutually constitutive nature of dialogue contributions and contexts (Rommetveit, this volume, Chapter 4)). So far, I have used the term ‘power’ in a somewhat loose, perhaps partly metaphorical sense. However, since initiatives and responses have to do with controlling versus being controlled, there is also a sense in which social power is exercised within the social encounter, at a microlevel. The point, then, is to see this ‘micropower’ as a very elementary form of power.

Wrong (1968, p. 673) notes that ‘asymmetry exists in each individual act–response sequence’. The speaker has a certain privilege in being able to take initiatives and display his or her own understanding. However, there is a continuous reciprocity of influence, since ‘the actors continually alternate the roles of power holder and power subject in the total course of their interaction’ (ibid., p. 673). Yet dialogues and situations characteristically differ in the global effects of these role alternations. Quite often, one party comes out as dominant—in one or several dimensions (see pages 155–7). For example, asking questions is a matter of trying to condition the other’s contributions more or less strongly, whereas simply answering questions may amount to little more than just complying with the other’s conditions. There are many ways of varying the strength of conversational contributions. It is therefore often quite instructive to study how and by whom the dialogue is driven forward in different situations.

Our next example is taken from a radio phone-in on the Swedish network (Ring så spelar vi with Hasse Tellembir), in which listeners are invited to phone the programme presenter, and the ensuing conversations are broadcast. Basically, presenter and caller chat for a while about everyday matters. The excerpt below is taken from this phase (though there are also other phases in the conversation, such as the caller’s being asked a quiz question).

II

\[
P = \text{programme presenter}; C = \text{middle-aged female caller}
\]

1. \(P\): What more shall we say about this day? The sun is shining here at the moment
2. \(C\): Yes, but it isn’t here
3. \(P\): It will
Excerpt II is a piece of reasonably balanced conversation with both parties taking a number of initiatives, interspersed with turns which are more like minimal responses. The caller brings in a couple of topics of her own, which is hardly surprising, given that these phone-in programmes tend to zoom in on the caller’s life. The presenter contributes to the progression of the dialogue – after all, it is his responsibility that something gets said – but his methods consist in rather phatically oriented invitations (e.g. 1; 9; 11). For comparison, look at excerpt III which is drawn from another, very similar phone-in (Upp till trettion with Ulf Elfving), the relevant difference being that callers on this programme are always children of at most 13 years of age. (Another difference is that the youngsters have sent in postcards in advance, giving some information about themselves, and actually, they are called up by the radio network employees, although this part is not broadcast.) The conversations typically take on a different character, with the programme presenter asking questions almost all the time. The caller’s role is thereby reduced to one of responding to initiatives from the interlocutor, with a few voluntary expansions now and then. The exchange type seems quite typical of a child’s conversation with an adult stranger.

III

Excerpt from a conversation with a 10-year-old boy (C)

1. P: Are you interested in being busy working with your hands, can you do woodwork and such things?
2. C: Yes, a little
3. P: Mm, have you ever made a bark boat?
4. C: No
5. P: You haven’t, no, but you do other things perhaps
6. C: Yes
7. P: What then?
8. C: Well, now that I have woodwork at school, then I have made some dice and such things, pencil stands and . . .
9. P: I see. How is . . . what’s the bird’s name, is it . . .
10. C: Kalle
11. P: Kalle, I see, I thought he had some other name. Kalle is it, what kind of bird is it?
12. C: It’s a budgy
13. P: That can talk?
14. C: No,
15. P: No, there are just a few budgies that talk, of course. Anyway, he sings?
16. C: Mm
17. P: That’s good. (2 sec) And then you have many nice pals in Åby?
18. C: Yes
19. P: (faintly) ’s written here, (louder) Åby is in the middle of Skåne, more or less, isn’t it?
20. C: Yes

It may be that III is fairly extreme in its asymmetry, even given the specific genre to which it belongs. However, most people will recognize the pattern of a benevolent adult who does his or her best with a shy and reticent, maybe even reluctant, child. The adult brings the discourse forward by introducing new topics and topic aspects and by trying to invite contributions from his or her passive interlocutor. Invitations, however, are not enough: the speaker has to ask explicit questions most of the time (soliciting initiatives). The subordinate party in excerpt III does little more than what is minimally required, given his interlocutor’s questions. Often, he does not even do this adequately, though the presenter tends to avoid pressing him (but see turn 7, which explicitly treats 6 as insufficient). An important point to observe is that the resulting dialogue is a collective product: both
parties exert influence over it. It is true that the presenter interactionally dominates his young interlocutor by forcing him to answer rather specific questions, but there is no doubt that the child's passivity also contributes to this pattern - without the presenter's persistent questioning, the dialogue would probably have come to a complete standstill. In other words, it always takes two to produce a dialogue; both parties are intercursively defining conditions for each other's contributions.

To recapitulate, in the progression of dialogue from utterance to utterance (or turn to turn) there is local reciprocity, an 'attunement to the attunement of the other' (Rommetveit, this volume, Chapter 4), embodied in the Janus-like nature of the individual utterance or turn. This is accompanied by a basic asymmetry inherent in the difference between the roles of speaker and addressee. Rommetveit (1987, p. 90) characterizes the dialogical condition as follows:

the dyadic constellation of speaker's privilege and listener's commitment: the speaker has the privilege of determining what is being referred to and/or meant, whereas the listener is committed to making sense of what is said by temporarily adopting the speaker's perspective on the talked-about state of affairs.

The speaker role is also associated with provisions to govern and control (or let him- or herself be governed and controlled). One might say that further asymmetries may be generated over and above the basic one: there is more to local power than what inheres in the speaker role as such.

There are cases of dialogues developing into symmetrical talk-exchanges: when person A has made a contribution, person B gives a relevant and expanded response to A's utterance, thereby providing further topic resources for the ensuing discourse; then A in his or her turn likewise provides a relevant and expanded response, then B continues in the same way, etc. There are also several ways of generating asymmetries deviating from this symmetric pattern by deploying the dynamics of initiatives-and-responses in specific ways.

For example, a speaker can demand or solicit responses rather than just invite them; as we noted earlier, if he or she asks questions, he or she makes answers obligatory rather than facultative. On the other hand, a speaker can inhibit further talk on a topic, for example by initiating new topics. Another instance of dominant behaviour is to make meta-communicative comments on the partner's utterances (rather than responding to them topically), or simply to ignore the other's contributions and connect to one's own prior utterances. The latter would lead to a halting and less well co-ordinated dialogue (what Linell, Gustavsson and Juvonen, 1988, have termed 'oblique ness'). These are examples of domineering behaviour. The subordinate party's weapon, unless he or she wants to counter-attack by attempting moves similar to the ones just mentioned, is to respond minimally or to refuse to respond. This kind of resistant behaviour will also have a decisive influence on the dialogue, as excerpt III demonstrated.

Initiatives and responses are local events. Many contributions of similar kinds, however, may add up to aggregated patterns emerging over sequences of utterances. For example, if one party keeps asking questions and his or her partner can do nothing but give answers on the conditions set up by the questions, we will get a summative pattern of interactional dominance for the former speaker. Linell, Gustavsson and Juvonen (1988) have explored the idea of computing various quantitative measures of dominance and coherence in dialogue by looking at properties of sequences. As will be conjectured below (see pages 166–70), such measures can be used in diagnosing social situations. First, however, we need to look a little closer at some kinds of dominance in dialogue.

**Dimensions of dominance**

Although some of my prior remarks might invite a discussion of the major sociological issues of power and exchange, it is not possible to give them anything like adequate treatment in this context. My objective is rather different: I propose a study of some local and global properties of dialogue. In particular, I want to discuss some aspects of dominance and asymmetries in dialogue. I shall then use the term 'dominance' to refer to various more or less visible (manifest) dimensions or structures in dialogue and discourse. 'Power' can arguably be conceived of as more abstract than dominance and as involving an invisible (latent) macrostructure. Dimensions of dominance in dialogue can be identified without any specific a priori assumptions of social order and social power; instead, dialogue analyses per se may lead us to a model of the provisions for and constraints on different sorts of social situations and communicative activities (see pages 166–70). These provisions and constraints are, of course, partly imposed or supported from outside, via institutionalized rules and social power relations (e.g. courtroom procedural rules, or norms for and expectations of adult–child interaction). However, they are also reproduced through the particular patterns of situated collaborative action; that is, they can be understood partly as
generated ‘from within’, through the dynamics of the self-organizing principle of dialogue (Luckmann, this volume, Chapter 2).

Dominance in interaction is multidimensional: there are many different ways in which a party can be said to ‘dominate’, i.e. possess or control the ‘territory’ to be shared by the communicating parties. The territory, of course, is the jointly attended and produced discourse. Dominance is a property of sequences of entire social interactions (dialogues) or of phases within them. (Asymmetries, in my terminology, could also be local.) There are at least four different dimensions involved in dominance in interaction: amount of talk, semantic dominance, interactional dominance and strategic moves.

With respect to the first dimension, the dominant party is simply the one who talks the most (purely quantitative dominance). Semantic (or topic) dominance would apply if one party predominantly introduced and maintained topics and perspectives on topic (see below). Interactional dominance would deal with patterns of asymmetry in terms of initiative–response (IR) structure. The dominant party is the one who makes most initiatory moves (contributions that strongly determine the unfolding local context) and makes relatively fewer weak moves (in which responding aspects prevail). The subordinate party of the interaction, on the other hand, allows his or her contributions to be directed, controlled and/or inhibited by the interlocutor’s surrounding moves. Finally, we distinguish strategic moves as a special type of dominance device: you need not talk a lot or make many strong moves, as long as you say a few, strategically really important things.

Interactional dominance is that aspect which will interest us most in this chapter. The reason, as I have already pointed out, is that it nicely ties up with the basic properties of dialogue contributions: their responsive and initiating features. In a series of empirical studies (e.g. Gustavsson, 1988; Linell, Gustavsson and Juvonen, 1988), we have developed a so-called ‘initiative–response’ (IR) analysis, which is built upon an operationalization of a number of turn types (categories of conversational contributions) in terms of a coding scheme. In this analysis, initiatives are further classified as more or less strong appeals to the interlocutor to respond under given conditions, and responses are categorized with regard to how and to what extent they are in fact determined by the other’s initiatives. Such types of dialogue contributions are assigned different interactional strength (or weight) on a six-point ordinal scale, and it thus becomes possible to calculate, among other things, the average interactional strength of each actor’s contributions (IR index = median value of interactional strength). We can then also derive a numerical value for the IR difference of the dyad as the difference between actors’ IR indices. The IR difference we take as an indicator of interactional asymmetry. For example, this difference would be small in a relatively symmetrical relationship such as that between caller and programme presenter in excerpt II (IR difference = 0.21), and large in the correspondingly asymmetrical relationship in excerpt III (IR difference = 2.01) (differences increase with increasing interactional asymmetry).

Unlike most traditional coding schemes for interaction analysis (from Bales, 1950, onwards) which are more or less speech-act based, IR analysis shares some major theoretical assumptions with the traditions referred to above (see pages 148–9). Methodologically, it is of course entirely different; indeed, Conversation Analysis (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984, p. 3) tends to reject coding schemes and quantification entirely as methodological tools in the analysis of dialogue. Similarly, Bakhtinian dialogue theory cannot of course be directly applied in ordinary empirical work, nor can it be specified in terms of a workable category system.

Interactional dominance

With respect to interactional dominance (and domineeringness), we find at least three main types of strong initiatives: directing moves, controlling moves and inhibiting moves. The first category comprises moves by which the speaker tries to force the other to respond under certain conditions. These are questions and directives in traditional terms. Asking questions is a well-known dominant strategy (unless we are faced with submissive questions, by which a party, often a subordinate one, shows deference and respect by suggesting that the other party talk). Of course, questioning can be handled in many ways. One strategy, which leaves little room for the interviewee to expand, is to have a battery of questions which are asked in sequence with no or infrequent comments on the answers received. The short excerpt (IV) below is taken from that phase of a police interrogation in which the police officer goes through a number of fixed questions when filling in a form about the suspect’s personal circumstances.

IV

P: Sven Erik Andersson . . . it was Erik you said, wasn’t it?
S: Yes

P: (5 sec) 55-07-11 (5 sec) 5386 (civil registration number which P takes from his file) (4 sec) occupation, what do I write there?
S: Officer_of_state
been investigated in numerous studies, including some of our own (Adelswärd, Aronsson and Linell, 1988; Linell, Gustavsson and Juvenen, 1988; Aronsson and Sätterlund-Larsson, 1987; Gustavsson, 1988; Adelsvärd, 1988; Jönsson, 1988; Adelswärd, Aronsson, Jönsson and Linell, 1987).

Controlling moves are used to evaluate, ratify or disqualify the other’s contributions (and the meanings indicated therein). I will give several examples of such moves on pages 161–6 (see also the examples from paediatric consultations to follow).

Interactional dominance may also be exercised by inhibiting talk from the other, i.e. by actions depriving him or her of opportunities to participate (lay out his or her version, express his or her wishes etc.). This can be done by explicit framing moves, by which topics or phases are closed. Another, somewhat less explicit way of doing it is to issue ‘declarative representatives’ (Searle, 1976), i.e. to declare one’s own versions or statements as the relevant things to say or as true facts that need not be subjected to further negotiation. As Searle observed, we often need an authority to lay down a decision as to what the facts are after the fact-finding procedure has been gone through... If the judge declares you guilty (on appeal), then for legal purposes you are guilty’ (ibid., p. 15). Very often, e.g. in the trials investigated by Adelswärd, Aronsson and Linell (1988), the admission (or denial) of guilt requires a routine-like sequence, in which the defendant’s admission (or denial) is restated by the judge. Only then, it seems, is it regarded as a legal fact, as is indicated in the following (slightly simplified) examples.

VI
J: Did you do this?
D: Yes.
J: You admit it (assertive tone).

Or, with an extra confirmation around it.

VII
J: Did you do this?
D: Yes.
J: So you admit it?
D: Yes.
J: OK.

A characteristic type of conversational contribution that is often made by professionals in the course of institutionalized fact-finding
procedures is what might be called reformulation (or formulation, according to Heritage and Watson, 1980). This is a rather powerful move by which the speaker both summarizes the gist of, or draws conclusions from, what the interviewee has said and, sometimes somewhat ambiguously, wants him or her to (re-)confirm. Often, the speaker uses his or her reformulation to introduce concepts from his or her (rather than the interviewee’s) conceptual framework (on this point, see also pages 163–5 below). This is done by the judge in the following exchange from a Swedish court trial.

VIII
The defendant is accused of tax evasion. He admits not having delivered certain accounts but denies that he intended to withhold tax money.

J: (...) Now the prosecutor says that when you did not give in these VAT accounts, it was your intention that taxes should be charged to the company with too low an amount. Is that right?
D: No, it isn’t, in that... ‘cause those which I got, you see, they went by the county police commissioner so I... 
J: Yes, is it so that the circumstances are correct (D: Yes) but you deny tax fraud, is that correctly understood?
D: Yes.

(Trial, No. 23:4; Adelswärd, Aronsson and Linell, 1988)

The relations between different kinds of dominance devices in dyadic communication are further explored and exemplified in Linell, Gustavsson and Juvenile (1988) and Adelswärd, Aronsson and Linell (1988). A partially different type of dominance becomes possible if there are more than two persons present in the conversation. It will then be possible to ‘steal’ another person’s turn or to reformulate or correct the other’s contributions. Bruner (1985, p. 31) notes that in adults’ conversations with small children, ‘the adult serves almost as the vicarious consciousness of the child in the sense of being the only one who knows the goal of the activity the two of them are engaged in.’ In a study of paediatric consultations in an allergy clinic, Aronsson and Rundström (1988) observed similar phenomena with parents routinely stepping in as the spokespersons for their children (who in this study were much older, from 5 to 15 years). I will cite a couple of examples from their study, where either the mother simply grabs the child’s turn (the doctor is clearly addressing the child) or she comes in right after the child, ratifying and reinforcing what he said and, as it were, explaining what he meant (implying that he could not, or did not get the opportunity to, express it properly himself).

IX
C = a 10-year-old boy
D: And Vilhelm, how are you then?
C: Well, I’m OK
D: You’re OK
M: He’s got a sore throat when he wakes up during the week, and his nose is blocked up so that he talks through his nose

X
C = another 10-year-old boy
D: You do have sports um of course, don’t you?
M: Mm, yeah... twice a week
D: (simultaneously) You can keep up?
C: No, yes well things go well
D: Yes they do
M: That depends of course on what they’re doing as well and... if they run running competitions and that kind of thing, then it’s not so... then he starts puffing and panting
D: Yeah
M: But otherwise he’s with them, I guess, ‘cause I talked to his teacher and she says that things are OK, so

Often enough, imputations of dominance can be based upon formal properties of utterances and on small units (single turns) in local contexts. Our examples have been more or less of this kind. However, in order to understand the power dynamics of social situations more fully, we must pay closer attention to meaning and perspective and to longer sequences. This we will do in the next section, which will thus also provide us with something like a bridge to (semi)-macrostructures.

Semantic dominance and privileged representations

A substantial portion of the power execution in talk-in interaction consists of constraints on when and for how long parties allow each other to talk (and to think between periods of talk). Directing, inhibiting and framing (i.e. regulative, meta-communicative) moves play an important role in this regard (Schegloff, 1987, pp. 39–40). In institutional contexts of the kind we have dealt with (court trials, police interviews, doctor consultations, social worker–client interactions etc.), questions have a major function in professionals’ discourse. For example, about 80 per cent of all the turns of judges and lawyers
are questions (Adelswärd, Aronsson and Linell, 1988). Every time a question is asked, the answerer is put under constraints. It is true that questions vary in coerciveness and that answerers can use their turns to introduce material into discourse other than that which has been strictly asked for, but clients do this to a relatively limited extent. There were more initiatives on the part of clients in the social welfare agency, while there were very few in the court trial and in some phases of the police interviews. Despite the differences, all these interviews and interrogations come out as rather asymmetrical when, as in our initiative-response (IR) measures (Linell, Gustavsson and Juvonen, 1988), one aggregates across individual turns and calculates the summative effects of the sustained interactional dominance of professionals.

If an actor is interactionally dominant (has a high IR index, i.e. he takes relatively many strong initiatives), he or she will stand a good chance of enforcing his or her own perspective or rationality onto the joint discourse. Conversely, a subordinate party (with a low IR index, i.e. with many weak responses) will have few opportunities to express his or her own point of view. However, there is no way of uncovering the ways actors use their turns to pursue their topics and perspectives by just looking at IR measures (which simply reflect the interactional functions of turns in their local contexts). Topic perspectives are normally the emergent products of sequences of turns (or of long monological turns). Often, not least in the task-oriented institutional contexts referred to above, sequences of questions (from the professional) are posed in the service of an argumentation, the superordinate goal of which is to provide a certain perspective on the events being described and assessed in the dialogue. Drew (1985) (cf. also Dunstan, 1980) has shown how lawyers in court use the format of coercive questions with (relatively) predictable responses to impose a perspective on things talked about. Here is an example from one of the trials used in our study, where the defence lawyer (DL) uses a series of questions to project an image of the defendant (D) as having been forced into his criminal activities by the threat of physical violence (a mitigating fact, which the defendant was not able to press into the discourse by himself).

XI

The defendant is accused of having rented video boxes and other goods and then sold them to get money for paying back a debt

DL: Did you know or had you rented any such boxes before?
D: No, no, no, that . . .

DL: So it was this person, your creditor, who told you how you should go about doing it, and . . .?
D: Yes, he said so, you know, now you've got your chance and so . . . He knew it, so you have just to step in and rent this, or something like that.
DL: But did you realize that by writing your name on those you um . . .
D: Oh yes, I realized that I would end up here in court, you know, and have to get things straight, you know, but anyway . . .
DL: But you mean that um the alternative was to be struck half dead if you did . . .?
D: Well, half, wholly maybe
DL: And you had no other possibilities to get your money?
D: I called my mum and tried to borrow money, but there was no way there either.

(Trial, No. 41:30–1)

In this case we see a defence lawyer using his privileged position to invoke a perspective on events talked about, and this was in the interest of his client and interactant. In the following examples we see professionals trying to reinterpret things said by defendants in ways that may be alien to the understanding of those defendants. In XII, the defendant (D) is a post-office employee who is accused of fraud. In the excerpt, reference is made to the conditions under which a preceding interview by the police was conducted. The judge (J) is trying to enforce a distinction between 'stressed' and 'pressured', which does not appear to be a clear distinction in the defendant's conceptual world.

XII

DL: Tell us how you experienced the first hearing then.
D: Well, I don't know what to say. Pressed or stressed. Stressed I was mainly I guess because I was in such a hurry. I had a good deal to do at the post office before I could go home. Just to get away as soon as possible.
J: Yes, but pressed or stressed, in this case there is a little difference, isn't there? Pressed, that falls back on the interrogator, doesn't it? And stressed, that is that you are a bit worked up. Which was it?
D: Well, it is difficult to tell now afterwards.
J: (to his secretary) It is difficult to tell if he was pressed or stressed on this . . .
The dialogue goes on without the defendant's being able to be more precise about what had happened in the police hearing.

(Trial, No. 8:41–2)

In many social encounters we find two (or more) persons engaged in talk about certain referents or a certain state of affairs (on reference there is often agreement between parties, see pages 155–6 on speaker's responsibility and recipient's commitment). Sometimes, however, the actors disagree on how the state of affairs should be understood and accounted for (what it means or is taken to be an instance of). Often, a superior is in a privileged position (has a privilege of formulation and/or interpretation), as in excerpts XI and XII. Sometimes, parties defend their positions on a more equal basis, as in the abortion trial reported by Danet (1980), where the choice of word *baby or foetus* is closely tied to the judgement of the whole legal and moral issue involved.

As a further illustration of differences in perspectivity and privileged representations (for this term, see Rorty, 1979), consider an example from Gustavsson (1988, p. 75). It is taken from a lesson in Swedish as a second language. A 12-year-old immigrant boy is talking with his teacher about a text they have read together. The text, drawn from a children's story-book, is about cats. One of them, called Måns, is said to be 'nasty' (Swedish *elak*). The teacher asks her pupil what this word means (one out of many language-based questions being asked in this lesson).

**XIII**

**T:** You know it goes like this, the nastiest cat is called Måns, what does that mean?

**P:** Well he's of the sort that can cheat

**T:** Mm, but if you are nasty, what are you like then?

**P:** He's of the sort that doesn't like Pelle (another cat in the story)

**T:** No but . . . but if . . . if someone is nasty, what is he like then?

**P:** (4 sec) don't know

**T:** You don't know, let's look it up and see (P: Mm) if we can find an explanation of it

(13 sec)

**P:** nasty (inaudible sequence)

**T:** (interrupts) you can almost say someone is unkind, one is evil (P: Yes) if one is nasty, you can write that down, nasty . . . equals evil, you know what that is, don't you (P: Yes), you are evil towards someone when you are unkind to someone and then you are nasty towards that person

The pupil tries to ground his answers in the text-world that is being talked about. But the teacher intends her question to be taken as pertaining to the decontextualized lexical meaning of the word 'nasty'. Her perspective is an abstract (meta-)linguistic one, founded in the specific (professionalized) activity of language teaching.

In encounters between professionals and lay persons, it happens rather frequently that meanings are negotiated. As we have just noted, this takes the form of discussing how words used (and often introduced) by the layperson should be understood. For example, there is a negotiation of how events in the client's or patient's life should be framed and understood in terms of legal, administrative or medical concepts. Often, and sometimes for good reasons, the final decisions (and agreements) are based on the professional's terms. The social encounter, however, becomes an arena where we witness a clash between different frames, the professional's world of expert knowledge and the layperson's everyday life world. Fragments of the actors' different rationalities and conceptualizations are made visible in the microcontext of dialogue, and, accordingly, voices of the different cultures are heard in actual dialogue. We can see one example in Mishler's (1984) 'voice of medicine' and 'voice of life world' in the medical encounter, another one in Gustavsson's (1988) language lessons where the teacher's frame of lexical meaning collides with the student's sense of meaning based on concrete texts and real-life experience.

Graumann (1989) has argued for an analysis of perspectivity in dialogue that sheds light on both perspective setting and perspective taking (cf. initiating and responding aspects). If we consider the global aspects of strongly asymmetrical interactions, we must then say that the subordinate party has very limited opportunities to set a perspective of his or her own. Sometimes, both parties (e.g. professional and layman) also have difficulties in taking the other's perspective.

It is obvious that many rights and responsibilities in social encounters cannot simply be derived from the roles of speaker versus addressee (versus other listeners). In fact, most obligative features seem to be tied to actor roles in specific activity types. In general, if we think of many institutional contexts, we find that the professional
party is often charged with the responsibility of guaranteeing the outcome of the interaction (e.g. reaching a decision or getting certain information or advice across). This is often combined with a right – on the part of the professional – to decide which contributions are relevant and what is the ‘correct’ understanding of things talked about. As a result, the professional has a global responsibility for the whole encounter (forcing him to make some strong framing moves), while the client has only local responsibility, e.g. answering the questions posed (Hobbs and Agar, 1985). This, no doubt, contributes to the fact that institutional discourse tends to exhibit asymmetries of several kinds (Agar, 1985).

Symmetrical and asymmetrical situations

There is a tendency within the social sciences to analyse social structures (and their micromanifestations in social encounters) either in terms of exchange relations or in terms of power relations. This seems to amount to isolating two types of interaction, one based on exchange and characterized by voluntariness, balance and symmetry, and one based on power and characterized by compulsion, imbalance and asymmetry. Following Baldwin (1978) and others, I would regard this as counterproductive to believe in two mutually exclusive families of situations. It is certainly true that situations vary in terms of asymmetry (or more accurately, different kinds of asymmetries), but all situations can be analysed both as exchange and power (or dominance). Direction, control and compliance, and initiative and response are always present in dialogue, and power relations are always to some extent intersubjective.

The study of interactional patterns in different sorts of communicative activities might help us to construct a theory of social situations or, more accurately, dialogue participation structures. A very simple taxonomy might build upon the two dimensions of symmetry–asymmetry and co-operation–confrontation, and thus involve the following four ideal types:

1. The symmetrical-and-co-operative type(s).
2. The symmetrical-and-competitive type(s).
3. The asymmetrical-and-co-operative type(s).
4. The asymmetrical-and-competitive type(s).

The symmetrical-and-co-operative type(s) are collaborative and integrative in nature. Both parties are equally active, and the typical initiatives would be ‘expanded responses’ to the interlocutor’s contributions, i.e. speakers both respond to what their partners have just said and introduce something new for them to respond to. Responses are invited rather than required. This seems to fit the ideal type of informal conversation between friends who are equally interested in maintaining their dialogue on topics with which they are equally familiar.

The symmetrical-and-competitive type(s) tend towards conflict and confrontation. Both parties are equally active, but they do not strive towards consensus. Instead, they pursue their own topics and argumentations (rather than jointly develop common understanding), and their interlocutor’s initiatives are often ignored. The underlying logic, in extreme verbal disputes, may be one of emotional rather than cognitive coherence: you ignore the other’s topic but respond to his or her accusation with a counter-accusation (Aronsson, 1987). Questions occur, especially challenging and meta-communicative ones (e.g. ‘How can you say such a thing?’).

The asymmetrical interactions are extremely common, particularly in situations where parties differ in status, competences and responsibilities. The asymmetrical-and-co-operative types, where most institutional interactions belong, are characterized by complementarity and divided responsibilities. One party takes the initiative and this is typically done by requesting (rather than just inviting) responses, i.e. by questions and directives, and the subordinate party tries to comply with the conditions, i.e. by answering questions and doing what he or she is told. In many cases, superior parties, e.g. professionals in institutional contexts, do provide some opportunities for subordinate parties to speak, but it is not uncommon that these opportunities remain unexploited. This then forces the superior to return to more dominant actions, and the whole interaction reverts to asymmetries again.

In the asymmetrical-and-competitive type(s), the dominant party still takes the initiative (asks questions) but the subordinate party fails to comply, exhibiting instead some sort of passive resistance (reluctance to enter into the dialogue). According to our empirical evidence, such conditions seldom materialize in institutional contexts, at least not in routine tasks in a relatively consensus-oriented society like that of contemporary Sweden. Yet, some of our court trials (see Adelswärd, Aronsson and Linell, 1988) approach the characterization given here, be this due to genuine non-co-operation on the part of the defendants or to their relative unfamiliarity with the courtroom situation. Reluctance to engage in an interaction on the other’s conditions is, however, not uncommon in many everyday
situations. In fact, many quarrels seem to have their origin in such situations: one party is first reluctant to get involved and then, when sufficiently aroused, engages in a really confrontational interaction, which means that the parties have by then collectively moved over to a symmetrical-and-competitive-type situation. In terms of power relations, the asymmetrical-and-competitive-type situation is quite interesting. We have a dominant party, who tries to control the situation by taking strong measures, and a subordinate party, who uses the weapon of passive resistance, in itself a kind of power exercise. As a result, the dominant party is forced into a position of relative powerlessness, at least as far as the interactional outcome is concerned.

If we let the two dimensions cross-classify orthogonally and have different social situations located in the two-dimensional space thus created, we might end up with a diagram like Figure 2. Labels or concepts for 'social situation types' (such as those used in Figure 2) are assumed to be gloses or summaries derived on the basis of aggregates of microencounters. They belong to the (partially) shared representations of the social world which people have built up over a long time (see page 146).

Figure 2 is reminiscent of diagrams developed by Forgas (1979) on the basis of multidimensional scaling of people's assessments of different dyads on a battery of Osgood scales (Wish, Deutsch and Kaplan, 1976). Although so far Figure 2 has been based on intuitive judgements, it seems possible to secure an empirical underpinning for it; studies of actual interaction patterns would yield a basis for classifying social situations and their associated communicative activities. However, two dimensions would then almost certainly be insufficient. In fact, some inadequacies in Figure 2 are rather easily identifiable. For example, sales negotiations have been placed somewhere in the middle between friendly conversations between equals and verbal disputes, which is in some respects unsatisfactory. Sales negotiations appear to involve a lot of mutual questioning which does not seem to be typical of either of the other two situation types. Like many other task-oriented encounters, sales negotiations seem to promote attempts at determining conditions for the contributions to come, i.e. demands for responses (questions). If we were to factor out this dimension (i.e. imposition versus non-imposition, or demanding (requesting) versus giving and inviting) and substitute as the third dimension straightness (versus obliqueness - where obliqueness, i.e. the opposite of straightness, involves avoiding giving straight responses to the interlocutor's preceding turns) we might get something like Table 3.

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**Table 3** A three-dimensional analysis of some social situation types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Symmetry</th>
<th>Non-imposition</th>
<th>Straightness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendly conversation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal dispute (quarrel)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation with reluctant partner</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>+/−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult–child conversation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+ (−)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview/interrogation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) with compliant interviewee</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) with non-compliant interviewee (passive resistance)</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+/−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales negotiation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+/−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer–expert/counsellor interview (active consumer)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This column concerns international (a)symmetry/dominance; especially in the cases asterisked (*), relationships may be reversed in terms of quantitative dominance (i.e. amount of talk).*
In fact, the characterizations in Table 3 already have partial empirical underpinning from our work with IR measures. By and large, symmetry could be operationalized in terms of IR difference, imposition by the solicitation (S) value and obliqueness by the obliqueness (O) value (or possibly the OR value, which includes both obliqueness and repair) as these measures have been described by Linell, Gustavsson and Juvonen (1988) (see also Gustavsson, 1988). In terms of the dimensions of Table 3, the above-mentioned pole of competition would be covered by [+symmetrical] plus either [−straight] or [+non-impositive] (or both). There would be two clearly co-operative types, namely [+symmetrical, +straight, +non-impositive] and [−symmetrical, +straight, −non-impositive], the latter being the complementary type where one party asks the questions and the other provides the straight and adequate answers.

Conclusion: Asymmetries and the genetic aspects of dialogue

I have been somewhat preoccupied with asymmetry and dominance in this chapter. One reason is that there is an inherent asymmetry at the lowest level of dialogue, when — at each moment — one party keeps the floor and the other one stays on the outside (although he or she may contribute from his or her addressee position, through back-channelling and otherwise). Another reason is that many, in fact most, situations are also more or less asymmetrical at the level of activity and situation. In other words, asymmetries are present both locally (in individual utterances/turns) and globally (in sequences and whole dialogues/interactions/situations), i.e., at the two levels which have usually been regarded as fundamental to dialogue analysis.

In my view, the study of asymmetrical dialogues is a basic concern for dialogue theory. Yet some scholars, particularly some ethnomethodologists (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1987), have argued that it would be a healthy research strategy to stick to ‘ordinary (or natural) conversation’, at least for the foreseeable future. Presumably, ‘ordinary’ conversation is characterized by symmetry between the communicating parties and by the absence of particular constraints on topic choice and turn-taking (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Agar, 1985, p. 147). Luckmann (this volume, Chapter 2) reserves the term ‘conversation’ for this type of dialogue. Heritage summarizes some arguments for the primacy of this kind of dialogue as follows:

Not only is ‘ordinary conversation‘ the predominant medium of interaction in the social world, it is also the primary form of interaction to which, with whatever simplifications, the child is first exposed and through which socialization proceeds. There is thus every reason to suppose that the basic forms of mundane talk constitute a kind of benchmark against which other more formal or ‘institutional’ types of interaction are recognized and experienced. (Heritage, 1987, p. 265)

In all fairness, it must be said that some Conversation Analysis scholars, including Heritage and Greshattch (1989), have started working with institutional talk. However, while it must be conceded that there is a point in the argument quoted above, CA seems to fail to recognize that a good deal of informal, mundane conversation is characterized by asymmetries. In particular, the above socialization argument seems partly mistaken. In fact, infants and children are extremely dependent on their interlocutors in dialogue. As Rommetveit (1983) points out, children ‘trade on adult truths’, relying on their initiatives, meanings, knowledge and responsibility. Children start in a world of asymmetrical-and-co-operative situations, where adults dominate, even though they try to promote their young partners’ development by expanding their responses (thus elaborating and upgrading the children’s contributions) and perhaps by avoiding being overly impositive. Thus later, and only gradually, there will be a transition from other-regulation to more self-regulation and shared responsibility for contributing topics and perspectives; considerable time must elapse before the child can play the role of a fully capable and knowledgeable actor in friendly conversation on equal terms (the symmetrical-and-co-operative types), in the asymmetrical-and-competitive types (quarrels, arguing, ‘sounding’ etc.) and of course in the various institutional contexts that exist. Some of the latter, however, clearly involve the professional behaving as a parent providing protection and good advice.

Luckmann (this volume, Chapter 2) observes that the term ‘conversation‘ (as used in the references given) would merely cover a range of particular, historical subspecies of ‘dialogue’. There is no reason to assume that symmetrical talk-exchanges are necessarily universal. Still, even if there were something like ‘ordinary conversations‘ in all human cultures, they would presumably constitute a minority of human dialogues. Asymmetries are probably more typical properties of dialogue than are symmetry and equality, at both local and global levels. Asymmetries inhere in both individual utterances (turns) and sequences. This makes them a natural focus in dialogue studies.
Notes

1. "Dialogue" is taken to mean, roughly, any kind of talk exchange between two (or more) persons who are mutually co-present (Luckmann, this volume, Chapter 2). Hence, I do not include a condition of equality or asymmetry in the definition.

2. All excerpts in this paper are rough, somewhat simplified, English translations of Swedish originals.

3. I take 'social power' to be a relational concept pertaining to actor A's resources and means to influence actor B and his or her cognitions, emotions, actions and dispositions to act. This means that power is always present at a microlevel in communication. Several classical types of power prove to be essential: power in action (communication involves acting and attempts at having others act); power through knowledge (communication is largely a matter of having particular understandings and perspectives developed and endorsed); and systemic (organizational) power (actors are, to large but somewhat varying extents, the voices of cultures and traditions).

4. I disregard here the concept of 'dominance' as used in studies of non-verbal communication (as in human ethology and primatology). One might argue for the use of the term 'control' instead of 'dominance'. I shall, however, use 'control' in a narrower sense, referring to an actor's moves which attempt or serve to assess and reinterpret retroactively the other's contributions (involving acceptance or (re-)negotiation, ratification or disavowal etc.). (The corresponding future-oriented action would be directing and guiding.)

5. The excerpts given here are in fact much too short to allow for the calculation of reliable IR measures. For details of the coding scheme and analyses based upon it, I refer to Gustavsson (1986) and Linell, Gustavsson and Juvenon (1988).

6. Bakhtinian theory and down-to-earth coding schemes simply belong to quite different contexts of scientific use. Apparent differences are often due to different exigencies and divergent purposes. At a general level, it is true that every utterance has both a retrospective (response) aspect and a prospective (initiative) aspect. Still, when we want to measure and diagnose properties of individual authentic dialogues, it is nevertheless meaningful to say that some dialogue turns are pure responses and others pure initiations — that is, if we restrict ourselves to the dialogue-internal (and local) ties between turns (Linell, Gustavsson and Juvenon, 1988).

7. The force of a local initiative is sometimes strong enough to break through firm and socially endorsed procedural rules. In particular, questions tend to get some kind of response, whoever asks them. Thus, even in situations where the right to ask questions is preallocated to a superior party exclusively (e.g. to the judge or counsel in court, or to the interviewer in a news interview), if, occasionally, the other party (defendant, interviewer), asks a question, he will usually, at least after a repetition, get a response from the holder of the superordinate role (Adelswärd, Aronson and Linell, 1988; Heritage and Greatbatch, 1989, p. 42).

8. For a study of sales negotiations, see Lampi (1986).

References


The power of dialogue dynamics


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